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TORTS - NEG GENcE Per Se. - Plaintiff alighted from a
west-bound street car in the middle of a city block at about 11:30
P. M., and walked to the north curb. After a brief pause she took
about ten steps along the curb to the west in order to ascertain if
there were any approaching automobiles. Seeing only the street
car whish was about two hundred feet to the west and at a point
where the street curved slightly to the north, plaintiff turned,
looked to the east for traffic, started to cross, and after having
taken about four steps into the street, looked to the west and saw
the dim lights of defendant's bus bearing down upon her at from
forty-five to fifty miles per hour. In order to avoid being hit,
plaintiff jumped forward and into the path of W's car by which
she was struck The bus had followed W who was driving at
twenty-five to thirty miles per hour up the street to the east for
some distance, and had pulled around W immediately after having
passed the street car about two hundred feet west of the point of
the accident. In an action for negligence the jury gave plaintiff
a verdict for $5,000. Defendant appealed. Held, that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and could
not recover. Yoder v. Charleston Transit 00.1
Plaintiff, working with another employee of a contractor employed by defendant, was told by defendant, that a certain elevator
was for the exclusive use of the contractor and his two employees.
Plaintiff, after removing packages from the elevator and allowing
the door to close, reopened the door after performing some brief
duties and, while looking behind and talking to his fellow employee, stepped into the shaft, not knowing that the car had been
removed by an employee of the defendant, and fell causing injuries. Trial court gave judgment for defendant, finding the
plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiff
appealed. Held, that contributory negligence is a question for the
jury where an invitee is injured while relying on a promise made
2
by the invitor. McHugh v. First Huntington National Bank.
One is negligent as a matter of law if the "negligence and
the necessary damage proximately flowing from it are so clearly
proved, both in fact and inference, that there is no room for an
honest difference of opinion between reasonable men ... , These
1 192 S. E. 349 (W. Va. 1937).
2 191 S. E. 844 (W. Va. 1937).
a Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896), cited in
Reilly v. Nicoll, 72 W. Va. 193, 77 S. E. 897 (1913), 47 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1199

(1914).
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
two cases well illustrate the difficulty which confronts a court in
applying this general proposition to concrete sets of facts.
The rule laid down in the Yoder case, that one is negligent
as a matter of law if, before crossing the street, he looks to ascertain if there are any vehicles approaching, but fails to see that
which, in the ordinary and reasonable use of his senses, he should
see, is one well recognized in the law,4 but there is some basis for
believing that its application to the fact of the principal case
stretches the rule beyond its reasonable and intended limits. Courts
generally in the application of this rule have limited it to cases of
undisputed contributory negligence, as for example, where plaintiff
failed to see an automobile which was approaching toward her at
the slow rate of from five to eight miles'per hour5 or where the
plaintiff in broad daylight had an unobstructed view for two hundred and fifty feet and failed to observe the approaching cab.0
Furthermore, the Iowa court in deciding a case presenting substantially the same facts as the Yoder case, held the question of
contributory negligence to be one for the jury.7 In view of the
fact that the jury found that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, and that one of the judges in the appellate
court dissented from the holding of the majority,8 it seems that the
facts of this case hardly present a situation in which ". . . . there
is no room for an honest difference of opinion between reasonable
men.... .,,9

The McHugh case presents another situation in which courts
frequently apply the doctrine of negligence per se. Here, however,
4 Fulton Bldg. Co. v. Stichel, 135 Md. 542, 109 Atl. 434 (1920); Craft v.
Fordson Coal Co., 114 W. Va. 295, 171 S.E. 886 (1933).
5Molda v. Clark, 236 Mich. 277, 210 N. W. 203 (1926).
6 Mertens v. Lake Shore Yellow Cab & Transfer Co., 195 Wis. 646, 218 N. W.
85 (1928).
7 Rolfs v. Mullins, 179 Iowa 1223, 162 N. W. 783 (1917).
In this case deceased and her husband were crossing from the north side of HT street at a
point about sixty feet east of the intersection of H and T streets, H street here
curving sharply to the south. At the moment they looked before crossing,
the sight of defendant's automobile was blocked by a street car which had
come north on T street and was turning west on H street. After taking a few
steps from the curb, deceased was struck by defendant's car.
sThe disienting judge argues that it is very likely plaintiff did not see
the two approaching vehicles, basing this on the fact that only three seconds
would have been required for the bus to have covered the distance between the
point at which it emerged from behind the street car and the point at which
it struck plaintiff and that this brief period might easily have been consumed
by plaintiff in performing her duty of looking to the left before crossing the
street.
Hogan v. Manhattan Ry.Co., 149 N. E. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896).
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the court found sufficient facts, distinguishing this case from those
falling within the general rule, to hold the determination of contributory negligence to be for the jury.
A.F .G.
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